Who Would Have Thought, Comrades, That The Most Severe Form of Attempted Internet Censorship Could Originate in a Community Hospital, Abington Memorial, That Alleges Itself A Non-Profit Public Servant?

I would not have thought such an attempt at abridgement of fundamental American rights could originate in a local hospital, until this Motion by the defense in the EHR-related lawsuit initiated by my deceased mother in which I am now substitute plaintiff proved otherwise:


75E4/19/2013MotionBY ABINGTON MEMORIAL HOSPITAL MOTION TO PROHIBIT COMMENTARY ABOUT THIS LITIGATION TO ANY PUBLIC CONTEXT WITH MEMORANDUM OF LAW WITH SERVICE ON 04/19/2013No9267260

The hospital was attempting to have the Court issue a Motion for Prior Restraint (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Prior_restraint), including against my writings here in the Healthcare Renewal blog, in a civil matter.

In my view this attempt sets a very deleterious precedent for others opposed to hospital practices.  A topic frequently discussed at this blog is imperial management.  Hospital management seems to have now become so arrogant that it apparently believes itself to have supra-Constitutional reach.  This bodes poorly for both patients' and clinicians' rights. How many other hospitals might try this, and not just against parties to litigation, hoping to get a favorable ruling?

Prior restraint (also referred to as prior censorship or pre-publication censorship) is censorship imposed, usually by a government, on expression before the expression actually takes place.

Prior restraint is often considered a particularly oppressive form of censorship in Anglo-American jurisprudence because it prevents the restricted material from being heard or distributed at all.  Prior restraint ... takes an idea or material completely out of the marketplace. Thus it is often considered to be the most extreme form of censorship.

... most of the early struggles for freedom of the press were against forms of prior restraint. Thus prior restraint came to be looked upon with a particular horror, and Anglo-American courts became particularly unwilling to approve it, when they might approve other forms of press restriction.

Excerpts of plaintiff attorney's legal response are below (full PDF of this civil document is available at http://www.ischool.drexel.edu/faculty/ssilverstein/Abington_Memorial_Hospital_PL%20response%20to%20DF%20motion%20for%20prior%20restraint.PDF).  The response was, in fact, largely right out of the U.S. Constitution.   It is stunning that a community hospital, allegedly a servant of the public, would pull the legal stunts described which seem more akin to the methods of the former Soviet Union:

... as the entirety of the blog describes, Dr. Silverstein was troubled with, and expressed his opinion that, the defendant’s counsel’s repeatedly advancing an argument [that the same attorney had made three years prior regarding a medical malpractice case in the very same hospital - ed.] that was soundly rejected by another court [related to Certificates of Merit that delayed proceedings in my mother's case for almost two years - ed.], and the defendant’s failure to reference that case in any substantive way as opposing authority, was, in his protected opinion, malicious and unethical. As above, Dr. Silverstein’s comments on the matter are, as defendant agrees, his beliefs, opinions and viewpoints, all of which are protected speech under the Pennsylvania and United States Constitutions; that defendant’s counsel is dissatisfied with protected speech is not a matter for this court to address.

I would expect the defendant's counsel was following the instructions of, or at least was in collaboration with, hospital counsel, hospital senior management and the healthcare system Board of Directors.

... Unhappy that their improper tactics are now being exposed through Dr. Silverstein’s opinions in his blog, defense counsel initially threatened litigation. Now they ask this court to enjoin Dr. Silverstein, via prior restraint, from expressing his views. This extraordinary request comes in spite of the defendant offering nothing but pure speculation as the foundation upon which they ask this Court to strip the plaintiff of his First Amendment rights.

... Their request to strip plaintiff of his First Amendment rights is at odds with the Constitution, the caselaw, and the realities of the jury selection process, which has multiple safeguards in place to remove anyone who may have read and been influenced by Dr. Silverstein’s writings. Importantly, because of the defendant’s procedural tactics, this case, while over two years old, has only just begun discovery and the jury section process is nowhere in the near future.

... The simple fact is that Dr. Silverstein’s blog contains what defendant recognizes are his “beliefs, opinions and viewpoints” and, as such, they are protected. Neither defendant nor its counsel can meet the strict requirements of their unprecedented request to strip Dr. Silverstein of his constitutional rights. Their Motion must be swiftly denied.

Dated: 28 May 2013

The court, a civil Court of Common Pleas in this county in Pennsylvania, in fact did promptly make a decision: hospital motion for censorship denied.


182
6/24/2013OrderOF 6/20/13 DANIELE,J MOTION IS DENIED; CCNo9343590


The First Amendment lives, at least in Montgomery County, Pennsylvania.

However,  as the stories aggregated on this blog and others increasingly show, hospitals' mission of public service increasingly seems to be dying.

Attempted use of courts to abridge First Amendment rights by a hospital seems like the pinnacle of abandonment of pretenses of public service and accountability.  Corporate interests come first, not patients. 

This is a reason I increasingly am of the belief that hospital management cannot be trusted.  Accordingly, in my opinion, patients - especially acute inpatients - should have 24x7, independent advocates following every aspect of their care, receiving a daily full printout of any electronic records generated, and (if legal) even using one of the many new, small video/audio recording devices in encounters with hospital personnel.

"He said/she said" is no longer an option when dealing with a Сою́з Сове́тских Социалисти́ческих Респу́блик mentality.


Click for Patriotic music!

Perhaps Abington Memorial Hospital should consider adopting the rousing music above for their HR morale-building exercises.

I was a Medical Resident there in 1985-87.  Like Lev Davidovich Bronshtein, I guess I've been excommunicated for failure of obedience to the Party line.


My old residency ID.  I've now been excommuncated.

Da Svedanya for now, Comrades!

-- SS
 

A War on Patients: Panel Says EHRs Should Not Be Vetted Before Marketing and Deployment

"First, do harm - it's a learning experience, and injured or dead patients are just a bump in the road, anyway" - the apparent creed of the healthcare computing hyperenthusiasts

Joe Conn and Modern Healthcare published the following article:

Work group says OK to some HIT safety regs (link), Joe Conn, Modern Healthcare, Aug. 7, 2013

What is important is what safety regs the Workgroup said "no" to.  It comes as no surprise:
A federally chartered special work group with representatives from three federal agencies has submitted its draft recommendations on establishing a regulatory framework for health information technology. Chief among those recommendations is that health IT should not be subjected to pre-market federal regulation, but there were a few exceptions.

The exceptions are narrow, and are likely already covered as Class III medical devices by FDA (see http://www.fda.gov/MedicalDevices/DeviceRegulationandGuidance/Overview/ClassifyYourDevice/):

The exceptions under which there should be FDA regulation, according to the work group, include medical device accessories to be defined as such by the FDA; certain forms of “high risk” clinical decision support systems, such as “computer aided diagnostics,” also to be defined by the FDA; and some “higher risk software” use cases to be defined by the committee's own safety work group.

They did acknowledge the need for postmarket surveillance:
... The group also recommended: developing a federally supported, post-market surveillance system for health IT products “to ensure safety-related decision support is in place,” creating a process for gathering information on safety issues, aggregated at the federal level and establishing a public process for “customer rating of HIT to enhance transparency.”

Dr. David Bates [a professor at Harvard Medical School], chairman of the Food and Drug Administration Safety Innovation Act work group, presented the preliminary findings Wednesday at a meeting of HHS' Health Information Technology Policy Committee.

Let me translate this to plain English:  the health IT systems that go in (and their upgrades and patches) are recommended to be free from pre-marketing regulation and regulatory vetting.  Patients are to be the guinea pigs for testing of the software.  

If patients are harmed or killed, they get the honor of being named as "postmarket surveillance learning cases" who gave their all for the betterment of healthcare information technology.  

(Without their consent, but who needs consent to test experimental and unvetted devices on guinea pigs?)

Bates did express some liability concerns:

Asked during a question and answer period following his presentation whether the committee had considered the liability implications of its recommendations, Bates said, “It's not something we discussed at length, but it's something we can discuss over the next month.”

I, on the other hand, as a legal consultant on health IT-related medical errors and evidence tampering, am considering liability issues.

Unfortunately, patients would rather be whole than in lawsuits (or dead).  Also, sadly, it's physicians and nurses who will bear the brunt, if not all, of the liability for bad outcomes due to defective IT such as at these two recent posts, with vendor alerts regarding serious flaws of medication and other orders not being retained:

A clarification for all those proletarians who lack Harvard educations, and for the Workgroup members as well. Allow me to point out that the above manufacturer safety alerts of life-threatening fundamental flaws (involving entered text that "disappears", apparently found in live-patient scenarios, and the other "glitches" that did cause life-threatening errors sometimes en masse involving thousands of patients such as another apparent Siemens debacle at http://hcrenewal.blogspot.com/2011/11/lifespan-rhode-island-yet-another.html) would likely not have occurred if the systems had been vetted before being turned loose on patients.

Finally:  David and panel members, my mother and I thank you profusely. 

Oh wait...my mother can't thank you, she's dead from the toxic effects of un-premarket-vetted health IT on simple care processes at the very hospital where I performed my residency two decades ago.

She might have died a few times before she actually did thanks to other IT "glitches" that cropped up during her recovery from the first one, but I was able to (in one case, by sheer happenstance of showing up at  the right time) discover or provide staff with information to work around additional unvetted-health-IT flaws before those did her in.

It's taken more than a decade for critical-thinking, unconflicted writers and researchers ("iconoclasts") to force cybernetics-over-all hyperenthusasts (see here) like Bates and his panel members to own up the risks of health IT at all, e.g. via sites like this blog and this teaching site. These panel members IMO have their heads buried in sand.

Dr. Bates and his panel are, in my opinion, healthcare IT extremists, which is in part the apparent holding of the belief that computers have more rights than patients - and the other beliefs mentioned in this post:  "Another Health IT 'Glitch' - Can Digital Disappearing Ink Kill Patients?" at http://hcrenewal.blogspot.com/2013/08/another-health-it-glitch-can.html.

-- SS

Health Care Revolving Door Roundup

Increasingly, the regulatory and law enforcement functions of the US government in the health care sphere seem to be blending with the management of large health care organizations.  One mechanism for this is the "revolving door," the constant interchange of personnel between government agencies and corporate management. 


Here is a list of some of this year's interesting cases of people transiting the revolving door between US government agencies that are supposed to regulate health care organizations or enforce the relevant laws and the organizations subject to these regulations and laws.   Note that this list may not be complete.  It is difficult to keep track of these transitions. 

Leader of Health Care Fraud Section of Philadelphia US Attorney's Office to Teva Pharmaceuticals

Via MainJustice.org in March, 2013,

John Pease, who led the government and health care fraud section in the U.S. Attorney's Office in Philadelphia, has left the Justice Department for a job with a pharmaceutical company.

Pease, 45, is a new senior counsel at Teva Pharmaceuticals, where he oversees government investigations of the company for the Americas.  'I was just ready to try something different,' Pease said in an interview.

 Leader of US Department of Justice Fraud Section in Charge of Health Care Issues to Law Firm as Defender of Companies and Senior Executives

The initial notice again was via MainJustice.org in March, 2013

Sam Sheldon, the deputy chief in the Criminal Division's Fraud Section who oversaw health care fraud prosecutions, is leaving the Justice Department to join Quinn Emanuel Urquhart & Sullivan LLP.


Mr Sheldon's new job was made clear on the firm's website,

Sam Sheldon is head of the firm’s Health Care Practice Group.  He is a trial lawyer who represents companies and senior executives in litigation before the United States federal government including Department of Justice and Department of Health and Human Services, and other law enforcement and regulatory agencies.

FDA Deputy Commissioner for Global Regulatory Operations and Policy to Mylan

This story, in April, actually made it (briefly) to Reuters,

 Generic drugmaker Mylan Inc said on Tuesday it hired Deborah Autor, deputy commissioner for global regulatory operations and policy at the U.S. Food and Drug Administration, to help oversee its global regulatory strategy.

Leader of Health Care Fraud Enforcement of Philadelphia US Attorney's Office to Law Firm as Industry Defender

From Bloomberg, in August, 2013,

Marilyn May, a False Claims Act litigator at the U.S. Justice Department, joined Arnold & Porter LLP’s Washington office as litigation counsel with a focus on healthcare, pharmaceutical and medical device industry defense work. 

May was the head of healthcare fraud enforcement in the U.S. Attorney’s Office in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. She coordinated healthcare fraud cases and investigations as well as handled False Claims Act cases involving pharmaceutical and medical device companies, hospitals, nursing homes and other healthcare providers, the firm said. 

The law firm's website states,

 Her litigation practice focuses on pharmaceutical, medical device and healthcare defense matters.


Summary

In each of these cases, a person with responsibility for regulation of and/or law enforcement for health care organizations went through the revolving door to either work for health care corporations subject to such regulation and/or law enforcement, or work for legal firms that specialize in defending such corporations and their leaders in regulatory and law enforcement actions.

As far as I know, none of these instances was the least bit illegal.  However, like previous examples of the revolving door, they raise the concern that people in government regulation or law enforcement who think that they may have future lucrative job prospects helping health care organizations attenuate regulation and law enforcement may not be the most enthusiastic, aggressive, or persistent regulators or law enforcers.  Why would one want to upset one's future employer?

While these cases of the revolving door are legal, they are clearly conflicts of interest in the sense that the prospect of such future employment likely may increase the risk of compromising a government official's devotion to serving the public and enforcing the law, if not in the legal sense.  In some particular case, the revolving door may actually lead to corruption according to the Transparency International definition, abuse of entrusted power for private gain, if not according to the legal definition.  Thus the continuing occurrence of government officials blithely transiting the revolving door no doubt was a reason that more than 40% of the public consider the US health care sector to be corrupt (see this post.)

True health care reform would require curtailing the severe sorts of conflicts of interest created by the revolving door.  This might require both improving pay and working conditions for government regulators and law enforcers, and specific laws to prevent immediate transitions from being a regulator/ law enforcer to handling corporate responses to or defenses of such regulation and enforcement.

Of course, I can already hear the protests of those people who decry paying more for government or increasing government regulation.  I can at least hope that the protests are not from those who personally profit from the current seemingly corrupt system.  


Today's Bad Health IT Systems: More Dangerous Than Paper?

I believe in 2013 that they are.

(Definition of bad health IT is here:  http://www.ischool.drexel.edu/faculty/ssilverstein/cases/)

I recently posted about two "glitches" in a major EHR seller's clinical systems, Siemens Healthcare, affecting safety-critical functions of medication reconciliation and medication ordering.


Considering these, plus the many "glitches" reported by the only EHR seller who does so via FDA's MAUDE database (see here: http://hcrenewal.blogspot.com/2011/01/maude-and-hit-risk-mother-mary-what-in.html), and the others posted at this blog at query link: http://hcrenewal.blogspot.com/search/label/glitch, the following issue needs serious consideration by policymakers.

Namely, the issue that enterprise electronic medical command-and-control systems, which today's "EHRs" in reality are, are on their face more risk-prone than the paper systems they are replacing.

The "glitches" reported above are clearly the tip of the iceberg due to industry norms of secrecy, the absence of most of the industry in reporting to FDA MAUDE or anywhere, and my limited sources of information.  It is likely the true level of "glitches" in live EHR/clinical IT installations is far, far higher  - conservatively, I believe, at least two orders of magnitude.

Workarounds to IT "glitches" such as recommended in the Siemens bulletins at the aforementioned posts cause hospital officials to have to  reliably get the notices to all users of the systems, including medical students, nurses, physicians and allied health professionals.

The workarounds also cause users to:

1)  have to deviate from habits of use acquired in training and active use of the systems in question;
2) remember, without fail, to deviate from habits of use acquired in training and active use of the systems in question, in effect giving them the responsibility of caring for sick patients and for "sick" information technology;
3) keep in mind any other extant workarounds that exist waiting for "fixes"; and
4) be constantly on guard for information storage failures.

In fact, the recent Siemens "glitches" and workarounds represent a clear danger to patient safety.  If these were more conventional medical devices, they'd be recalled.

See my Dec. 14, 2011 post "FDA Recalls Draeger Health IT Device Because This Product May Cause Serious Adverse Health Consequences, Including Death" (http://hcrenewal.blogspot.com/2011/12/fda-recalls-health-it-software-because.html) and July 23, 2012 post "Health IT FDA Recall: Philips Xcelera Connect - Incomplete Information Arriving From Other Systems"(http://hcrenewal.blogspot.com/2012/07/health-it-fda-recall-philips-xcelera.html) for examples where health IT defects similar to the Siemens issues were, in fact, recalled.

Further, with paper records or tangible images, a page or image can be lost, or it can be illegible.  In the case of lost, in any quality paper record keeping system the information stewards or others using the paper (e.g., office staff or ward clerks) will generally note the absence and act accordingly.  Further, illegible notes or orders will most often be recognized as illegible and result in attempted clarification or other corrective actions.

On the other hand, when electronic systems:

1)  lose modified information en masse as in the Siemens examples but keep the old, or
2)  when outright errors such as en masse truncation occur (as in the thousands of prescriptions whose long-acting suffixes were cut off at Lifespan in Rhode Island, see "Yet another health IT "glitch" affecting thousands" here: http://hcrenewal.blogspot.com/2011/11/lifespan-rhode-island-yet-another.html), or
3)  images are lost (see "Potential Image Loss in GE Centricity PACS" here:  http://hcrenewal.blogspot.com/2012/11/potential-image-loss-in-ge-centricity.html) without warning-

- There are no "flags" that the obsolete, truncated or missing information is erroneous.

What remains is perfectly legible, perfectly convincing and perfectly deceiving.

Electronic healthcare information systems on their face create more risk than paper record systems.  Further, the problem with "bugs" and "glitches" will not go away with today's industry models of "hiring down" and lack of regulation.  Every new upgrade or patch is suspect for introducing new bugs.

Paper does not suffer these issues, unless disappearing ink is used to cross out the old and add new information ...

Not that I am advocating for a return to 100% paper, but certain critical functions probably are best left to paper.  Further, hundreds of billions of dollars can certainly buy:

1)  a lot of Health Information Management professionals to perform continuous QA of paper,
2)  a lot of document imaging systems to make the paper records available anywhere, anytime they are needed, and
3)  a lot of data entry personnel to relieve clinicians of clerical burdens so they may use their valuable experience more productively, as guest poster Howard Brody points out at http://hcrenewal.blogspot.com/2013/07/guest-post-incompetent-management.html.
4)  a lot of sensible regulation of this industry's product quality.

-- SS

Can Digital Disappearing Ink (An EHR "Glitch") Kill Patients? Part 2

At "Another Health IT "Glitch" - Can Digital Disappearing Ink Kill Patients?" just yesterday, on August 5, 2013, I wrote about a Siemens EHR "glitch" worse than any paper records system problem.  Typed order changes in the medication reconciliation process on patient discharge are disappearing into thin air, unknown to the clinicians typing the orders.  This is likely due to an issue such as some programmer forgetting to put in a statement to write the text to disk, complicated by software testing problems that missed the defect.

I noted:
... "Glitch" is a banal term used by health IT extremists (those who have abandoned a rigorous scientific approach to these medical devices as well as basic patient protections, in favor of unwarranted and inappropriate overconfidence and hyper-enthusiasm).  The term is used to represent potentially injurious and lethal problems with health IT, usually related to inadequate software vetting and perhaps even "sweatshop floor in foreign country directly to production for U.S. hospital floors" development processes (this industry is entirely unregulated).
 
Paper records may have illegible writing that would generally cause the reader to make a phone call or otherwise contact the writer, but those events are one-offs.  EHR defects potentially affect hundreds of installations and thousands of patients, en masse.  (If patients are not dying en masse from such errors, then the whole argument against paper and for IT on the issue of vastly improved safety goes out the windows, but that's an argument for another time.)

Siemens has just released another "glitch" announcement, this time with CPOE (computerized order entry):


(Medication orders "glictch" safety complaint.  Click to enlarge, text below)

Text is as follows:

August 2, 2013

Safety Advisory Notification

Soarian® Clinicals Medication Orders, Safety Complaint ID# EV06643783

Dear Customer:

This notification is to inform you that the Soarian Clinicals Medication Orders may not be operating properly in some cases in Soarian Clinicals 3.3 Service Pack 6 and above.

I note that "glitches" are not uncommon after software patches and upgrades.  See examples at the query link http://hcrenewal.blogspot.com/search/label/glitch.   This reflects inadequate vetting of the patches.

I also note that "medication orders not operating properly" is a very, very serious matter.

Although this may affect only some customers, we are taking a conservative approach and are alerting you to this potential problem. As such, please forward this notification to appropriate personnel as soon as possible.

"May only affect some customers?" (I suspect from this double-indefinite that who is affected is not rigorously known).  "Taking a conservative approach?"  I ask:  what would a non-conservative approach entail?

This letter is being sent as a precautionary measure as there have been no adverse events reported from customers.

Again, they mean "yet."

When does this issue occur and what are the potential risks?

The issue occurs while placing medication orders. In certain cases, when users select orders from predefines or personal favorites and make changes on the order detail forms, the changes are correctly saved and displayed on the forms but the Order As Written (OAW) is not refreshed to reflect the changes. The incorrect OAW is displayed in Siemens Pharmacy in the Order As Written window but the discrete order details are correct. As a result dispensing or administering relying solely on the OAW prior to pharmacy validation may result in error.  [Putting patients directly in harm's way, patients who never consented to the use of these experimental and unvetted medical devices - ed.]  Once the order is validated the OAW in Soarian is updated correctly.

This problem - manually changed data apparently not written to disk - seems similar to the "digital disappearing ink" med reconciliation bug in the aforementioned Aug. 5, 2013 post.

Immediate steps you should take to avoid the potential risk of this issue:

To prevent this issue from occurring at your facility, dispensing or administering of unvalidated order should rely on the order details displayed. Secondly, any deviations from the predefined or personal favorites should be phoned in to pharmacy as a verbal order. During validation, if the pharmacist sees a discrepancy between the order detail and the OAW, verbal follow up with the ordering physician is required.

Again, a workaround.  How many times will this workaround be forgotten, compared to issues of illegibility in a paper record resulting in a phone call to the writer?

Steps that Siemens is taking to correct this complaint:

We are diligently working to develop a correction and will test and deliver it as soon as possible.

Perhaps they should have been working more diligently to detect the "glitch" before it went live.

Also, perhaps the touted power of EHRs to reduce medical errors needs to be re-examined.  Considering bugs like these - creating en-masse problems far worse than possible with paper (another en-masse example at http://hcrenewal.blogspot.com/2011/11/lifespan-rhode-island-yet-another.html) - then, if the EHRs are so essential to safety, one would expect significant morbidity and mortality from these defects.

If one is to believe patients are not being injured by "glitches", then the expenditure of hundreds of billions of dollars for these systems on the basis of "error reduction" compared to paper is likely a waste of money and resources.

--  SS


The Mystery of the Northwestern Settlement

Watson, quick, the game's afoot.  We have discussed a large number of legal settlements by large health care organizations that serve as markers of misbehavior and often lack of leaderships' responsibility for same.  These settlements often follow a common pattern.  Yet this week a settlement appeared that was quite different, and hence raised some important questions.

The Basics of the Settlement

I will summarize the settlement as described by the Wall Street Journal.  The basic points were:

Northwestern University agreed to pay nearly $3 million to settle claims that a former cancer researcher fraudulently used federal grant money for personal expenses, including food, hotels and airfare for family trips between 2003 and 2010.

The settlement in the civil suit was unsealed Tuesday by the U.S. Attorney for the Northern District of Illinois, which investigated claims brought by a whistle blower under the False Claims Act.

The settlement seemed to be more about the researcher, Dr Charles L Bennett, than Northwestern,


At the time of the alleged fraud, Dr. Bennett was the principal investigator on research funded by the National Institutes of Health, studying adverse drug events, multiple myeloma, a blood disorder known as thrombotic thrombocytopenic purpura, and quality of care for cancer patients.

According to the settlement agreement, he allegedly billed federal grants for family trips, meals and hotels for himself and friends, and for 'consulting fees' for unqualified friends and family. Northwestern also allegedly improperly subcontracted, at Dr. Bennett's request, with various universities for services that were paid for by the NIH grants.

'Allowing researchers to use federal grant money to pay for personal travel, hotels, and meals and to hire unqualified friends and relatives as 'consultants' violates the public trust and federal law,' U.S. Attorney Gary S. Shapiro said in a statement.

Meanwhile,

 Northwestern, which is in Evanston, Ill., cooperated with the investigators and didn't admit to any wrongdoing, according to a statement by the university.

The settlement was the result of the actions of a purported whistle-blower,


The whistleblower, Melissa Theis, worked as a purchasing coordinator in the Feinberg school's department of hematology and oncology, processing invoices when she 'noticed some red flags,' according to her attorney, Linda Wyetzner, of the Evanston firm Behn & Wyetzner Chartered.

The federal False Claims Act allows private citizens who allege government programs are being defrauded to file actions on behalf of the government and receive a portion, usually 15% to 30%, of any recovered damages. Ms. Theis will get $498,100 in settlement proceeds, according to the agreement.

The settlement resulted from the efforts of multiple federal agencies,

 The allegations were investigated by the NIH, Federal Bureau of Investigation, U.S. Department of Health and Human Services Office of Inspector General and the U.S. attorney's office.

Curious Aspects and the Questions They Raise

So here is yet another settlement by a large health care organization, in this case, the prestigious academic medical center of a well known university.  This one, however, does not follow the usual pattern, and includes some quite curious aspects.

Media Attention vs Severity

The settlement so far has generated articles in the WSJ (above), the Chicago Tribune, the Chicago Sun-Times, Crains Chicago Business, Medscape, Modern Healthcare, UPI, Bloomberg, other local Chicago and university publications, and local outlets in South Carolina, the state in which Dr Bennett currently works.
 
The amount of the grants that Dr Bennett allegedly misused was $8 million, according to the University Herald.

There are no allegations that any activities of Dr Bennett or the university affected the quality of clinical research, clinical teaching, or patient care.

Contrast that substantial media attention to that generated by another recent settlement we just discussed, that of Pfizer misbranding of Rapamune (look here.)  This involved the excess promotion of a relatively dangerous drug that likely resulted in harm to many patients.  The over-promotion may have caused up to 90% of the drug's $200 million yearly sales.  The settlement itself was for $491 million.  Yet while it got more coverage, mainly from local media outlets which covered it because the settlement will result in payments to individual states, only four big national outlets have covered it so far, again the Wall Street Journal, and  the New York Times, Reuters and Businessweek.

Why did a relatively small settlement of alleged financial misbehavior without clinical implications get nearly as much attention as a settlement fifty times bigger that involved actions that likely harmed patients?

Intensity of the Government Response

Dr Bennett's alleged misuse of grant funds required investigation by four different federal agencies, including the FBI.  Pfizer's misbranding of a dangerous drug seemingly was handled only by one, and the FBI was not obviously involved.  In fact, the FBI rarely has rarely been mentioned in the media coverage of most of the legal settlements we have discussed.

Why did again a case of relatively small alleged financial misbehavior require such massive federal resources when much bigger cases which had implications for clinical care, policy, or research seemed to command lesser resources?

Naming and Shaming

The settlement did not involve any admission of any wrongdoing by Northwestern.

In contrast, nearly all the news coverage of this settlement emphasized the role of Dr Charles L Bennett.  The coverage seemed to be following the lead of the Department of Justice press release, which included,

 Northwestern allegedly allowed one of its researchers, Dr. Charles L. Bennett, to submit false claims under research grants from the National Institutes of Health. The settlement covers improper claims that Dr. Bennett submitted for reimbursement from the federal grants for professional and consulting services, subcontracts, food, hotels, travel and other expenses that benefited Dr. Bennett, his friends, and family from Jan. 1, 2003, through Aug. 31, 2010.

Yet Dr Bennett appeared not to be a party in this settlement, and it was unclear whether he had a direct opportunity to respond to it.  The Wall Street Journal did note that after it was announced,

 James M. Becker, an attorney for Dr. Bennett, said, 'We deny the allegations.…We are actively engaged in discussions to resolve the allegations.'

We have discussed numerous legal settlements by large health care organizations, often involving hundreds of millions or even billions of dollars, sometimes involving guilty pleas by the companies involved or their subsidiaries.  Almost never do these settlements name or involve in any way persons who authorized, directed, or implemented the misbehavior.  In fact, we have commented again and again about the impunity of health care organizational managers and executives.  For example, the recent $491 million Pfizer settlement did not name or punish any individuals.  Furthermore, Pfizer's $2.3 billion settlement for deceptive marketing of a drug later pulled from the market (Bextra) did not name much less penalize any responsible individuals (look here.)  Also, GlaxoSmithKline's $3 billion settlement of numerous unethical practices did not name much less penalize any responsible individuals (look here).

So why was naming and shaming Dr Charles L Bennett such an important part of the relatively small Northwestern settlement, when much larger settlements, many involving unethical behavior that could have harmed patients or distorted medical research, and some of which involved corporate guilty pleas to criminal charges did not involve naming and shaming any responsible person?    
 
How Accountable was Dr Bennett?

As in the Wall Street Journal version, the settlement implies that Dr Bennett was the person most responsible.  The Chicago Sun-Times put it this way,

 Dr. Charles L. Bennett allegedly took his wife on personal trips, then illegally billed the flights, hotels and meals to the National Institutes of Health, claiming it was part of his cancer-fighting work. And he allegedly submitted phony bills for his work over a seven-year period beginning in 2003.

Here I will have to interject a bit of information about how federal grants work.  As I learned when I was a young faculty member, and as I confirmed with several other experienced researchers who have run and reviewed federal grants, these grants are made to institutions.  In the current case, the grant apparently went to Northwestern University.  The institution that receives the grant is responsible for making all payments and disbursements related to that grant.  The grant's Principal Investigator is responsible for the scientific conduct of the grant, but NOT payments, disbursements, business management or accounting.  The Principal Investigator can request that payments be made for various things, including travel expenses and consulting work.  But the Principal Investigator cannot directly authorize or make these payments.  They are authorized, signed, and made by institutional administrators, usually in grants and contracts offices or the equivalent, and usually only after copious paperwork to justify the payments.

So Dr Bennett may have requested reimbursement for travel expenses, or requested the university to hire a consultant.  But university managers must have made those payments, unless the university's grants administration mechanism had completely broken down.  Note that given the usual ways grants are administered, it would appear that Ms Theis, the ostensible whistle-blower, who will receive nearly one half of a million dollars from this settlement, actually may have had more direct responsibility for making the payments in question than did Dr Bennett.

Presumably, that is why the settlement was made by Northwestern.

Why then did the settlement, the DOJ press release, and the media coverage so emphasize Dr Bennett's responsibility, and so minimize the role of the university?  

Was Anyone Else Accountable?

The DOJ press release, and all the media articles on the case,  save one, mention only Dr Bennett as the person at fault.  Crain's Chicago Healthcare Daily, however, suggested someone else was responsible,


Northwestern University's nearly $3 million settlement of fraud claims by the federal government protects the director of the school's cancer center, who allegedly failed to supervise a researcher who used grant money to cover personal expenses over a seven-year period.

Dr. Steven Rosen, director of the Robert H. Lurie Comprehensive Center for Cancer, and Dr. Charles L. Bennett, a researcher who is no longer with the center, were both named in a whistleblower complaint unsealed on Tuesday, when the settlement was announced.

Dr. Bennett used federal grant money for family trips and fraudulent consulting fees for his brother and cousin from 2003-10, the government alleges.

Dr. Rosen 'failed to exercise appropriate responsibility,' Randall Samborn, a spokesman for the U.S. Attorney's office said. 'It was a supervisory function that he didn't adequately fulfill.'

When the settlement was announced, Mr. Samborn said the agreement did not cover either doctor. On Wednesday, he corrected himself, saying that settlement covered Dr. Rosen, but not Dr. Bennett.

As I noted above, the way federal grants work, it was the university, and its managers and leaders, who were responsible for making all payments on this and other federal grants.

Why did the government press release and the media coverage emphasize Dr Bennett's alleged role, while ignoring any possible responsibility of anyone else, especially his supervisor?


Backgrounds of the Principles

Dr Bennett and Dr Rosen, who seemingly were treated so differently in this settlement, travel in very different circles.

Most media articles described Dr Bennett as a prolific researcher and medical academic.  Although some described his areas of interest in hematology and oncology, only Medscape described one particular project of his.  

Dr. Bennett's research efforts included a 2008 study on which he was the first author (JAMA. 2008;299:914-924). The study was the first meta-analysis to identify an increased mortality risk in cancer patients associated with erythropoiesis-stimulating agents.(1)

In fact, as we discussed here,  Dr Bennett was the first author of a meta-analysis that was the first to show that epoetins increased the rates of adverse effects and death for cancer patients.  This evidence lead to reduced use of some very expensive drugs made by Johnson and Johnson and Amgen, and hence reduced revenues for both companies.

The JAMA article noted that at the time he wrote it, Dr Bennett had financial relationships with Amgen.  He and a coauthor "reported serving as consultants to AMGEN and Dr Bennett reported he has received grant support from AMGEN previously."

Note that Amgen pleaded guilty to misbranding its epoetin, Aranesp, and therefore paid fine and a civil settlement totaling $762 million.  Given the data on this drug class' adverse events, as shown by Dr Bennett and others, it is likely that the misbranding lead to patients being harmed by the drug without receiving any benefits (look here.) 

After writing that article, Dr Bennett became known as a strong skeptic of the pharmaceutical industry.  Just before the JAMA article was published, he coauthored an editorial which wondered if conflicts of interest would ever prove to be acceptable once sufficient research was done.(2)  In that article, he disclosed consulting for, and receiving honoraria and research grants from Amgen.  In 2010, he published research showing the effects of conflicts of interest on reporting of possible adverse effects based on basic science research about epoetins.(3)  By then he apparently no longer had financial relationships with Amgen.  In 2011, he reported a survey of major cases of pharmaceutical fraud resulting in legal actions.(4)

Dr Bennett became known for skepticism about the practices of pharmaceutical companies, and for publishing about the harms of specific drugs, despite his previous financial relationships with Amgen. 

However, Dr Rosen apparently has continued to work closely with industry.  His faculty disclosure page revealed  the following industry relationships

Consulting / Related Activities
Faculty member engaged in activities such as speaking, advising, consulting, or providing educational programs for the following companies or other for-profit entities:
  • Allos Therapeutics, Inc.
  • Carden Jennings Publishing Co., Ltd.
  • Cerner Corporation
  • Dava Oncology, LP
  • Elorac, Inc.
  • Envision Communications
  • Health Practices Consulting - unverified entity
  • Plexus Communications
  • Prostrakan, Inc.
  • Seattle Genetics, Inc.
  • Studio ER Congressi (Triumph Group, Inc.)
  • The Medal Group Corp.
In addition, faculty member received compensation for medical record consultation and/or expert witness testimony.

Ownership or Investment Interests
Faculty member had an ownership or investment interest in the following companies:
  • AuraSense, LLC
  • Nanosphere, Inc.
Royalty Payments and Inventor Share
Faculty member has the right to receive payments or may receive future financial benefits for inventions or discoveries related to the following companies or other entities:
  • Nanosphere, Inc. 
We have seen various important effects of individual and institutional conflicts of interest in health care.  We have seen corporatism and regulatory capture affecting government and its dealings in health care.  

Did Dr Bennett's break with a powerful industry make it easier to set him up as the villain in this story?

Summary   

The settlement by Northwestern University, which was mainly about allegations made against Dr Charles L Bennett, who was not a party to the settlement, was very different that the vast majority of the march of legal settlements whose continuation we have frequently discussed.

The settlement and its media coverage raised important questions whose answers would be important to the assessment of  our current regulatory and legal response to misbehavior by and within large health care organizations.  Health Care Renewal is about raising such issues by commenting on public information, media reports, and research.  I hope those with capacity to investigate will consider these questions.  Inquiring minds want to know.

Roy M. Poses MD in Health Care Renewal 

References

1.  Bennett CI, Silver SM, Djulbegovic B et al.  Venous thromboembolism and mortality associated with recombinant erythropoietin and darbepoetin adminstration for the treatment of cancer-associated anemia.  JAMA 2008; 299: 914-924.
2.  Djulbegovic B, Angolotta C, Knox KE, Bennett CI. The sound and the fury: financial conflicts of interest in oncology.  J Clin Oncol 2007; 25:3567-3568.  Link here 
3.  Bennett CI, Lai SY, Henke M et al.  Association between pharmaceutical support and basic science research on erythropoiesis-stimulating agents.  Arch Intern Med 2010; 170: 1490-1498.  Link here.
4.  Qureshi Z, Sartor O, Xirasagar S, Liu Y, Bennett CI.  Pharmaceutical fraud and abuse in the United States, 1996-2010.  Arch Intern Med 2011; 171: 1503-1506.  Link here.

Another Health IT "Glitch" - Can Digital Disappearing Ink Kill Patients?

Yes, it can.

There's been yet another "glitch" in the world of health IT (see http://hcrenewal.blogspot.com/search/label/glitch for more examples).

"Glitch" is a banal term used by health IT extremists (those who have abandoned a rigorous scientific approach to these medical devices as well as basic patient protections, in favor of unwarranted and inappropriate overconfidence and hyper-enthusiasm).  The term is used to represent potentially injurious and lethal problems with health IT, usually related to inadequate software vetting and perhaps even "sweatshop floor in foreign country directly to production for U.S. hospital floors" development processes (this industry is entirely unregulated).

This from Siemens Healthcare:



Click to enlarge.  Text below.

Text of this "Safety Advisory Notification":

August 1, 2013

Safety Advisory Notification
Soarian® Clinicals Medication Reconciliation EV06736602

Dear Customer:

This notification is to inform you that Soarian Clinicals Medication Reconciliation 3.3 may not be operating properly in some cases.

Although this may affect only some customers, we are taking a conservative approach and are alerting you to this potential problem. As such, please forward this notification to appropriate personnel as soon as possible.
This letter is being sent as a precautionary measure as there have been no adverse events reported from customers.

They mean "no adverse events reported - yet."  And if such events had been reported, Siemens would most certainly not make them public.  (Why should they, when there are no regulations?)

When does this issue occur and what are the potential risks?
This issue occurs when a user moves a free text in-house order from the current and home medications side (left side) to the discharge medication side (right side), and then modifies the continued free text in-house order in discharge reconciliation prior to saving the discharge reconciliation list. After the modification of the continued free text medication order, the changes to the free text medication order are not recorded in the saved discharge medication list.  [In other words, the changes to medication orders the user just typed disappear into thin air.  I note that medication reconciliation failures are among the most common causes of medical error - ed.]

The health IT extremists would invoke the "Leaned Intermediary" doctrine that lays all blame for errors on the user.  It seems the only way to avoid such liability would be after every "enter" or "save" action (or perhaps every keystroke?), users then verify what was saved or entered...

The "fix" to this "glitch" is not too far off from that:

Immediate steps you should take to avoid the potential risk of this issue:

To prevent this issue from occurring at your facility, instruct users not to modify continued free text in-house orders on the discharge medication list. Users may be instructed to enter free text in-house orders manually by selecting the add prescription action button and entering the order.

This is known as a "workaround."  Anyone who believes this edict can and will be 100% reliably followed in often chaotic medical environments, by users from medical students to nurses to physicians, is truly cavalier.

Steps that Siemens is taking to correct this complaint:

We are diligently working to develop a correction and will test and deliver it as soon as possible.

Perhaps FDA and Joint Commission need to inquire about exactly what testing and QC was done on the current code, testing that (if actually performed) did not detect this glaring and Siemens-admitted safety-risk "glitch."

-- SS
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