The Scientific Justification for Meaningul Use, Stage 2: The NWB Methodology

The Final Rule for Meaningful Use Stage 2 has been released.  It is at this link (PDF).  It is a mere 672 pages in length, a quick read during one's evenings of leisure.

Here is, from page 18 verbatim, the scientific justification for the program.  The finest scientific methods were used to achieve these criteria in justification of spending of $15 billion of taxpayer money in "incentives" (probably a low estimate), not counting the additional hundreds of billions the buyers themselves will spend that is diverted from your healthcare to the IT sector:

3. Summary of Costs and Benefits

This final rule is anticipated to have an annual effect on the economy of $100 million or more, making it an economically significant rule under the Executive Order and a major rule under the Congressional Review Act.

Accordingly, we have prepared a Regulatory Impact Analysis that to the best of our ability presents the costs and benefits of the final rule. The total Federal cost of the Medicare and Medicaid EHR Incentive Programs between 2014 and 2019 is estimated to be $15.4 billion (these estimates include net payment adjustments for Medicare providers who do not achieve meaningful use in 2015 and subsequent years in the amount of $2.1 billion).

In this final rule we have not quantified the overall benefits to the industry, nor to EPs, eligible hospitals, or CAHs participating in the Medicare and Medicaid EHR Incentive Programs. Information on the costs and benefits of adopting systems specifically meeting the requirements for the EHR Incentive Programs has not yet been collected and information on costs and benefits overall is limited. 

Nonetheless, we believe there are substantial benefits that can be obtained by eligible hospitals and EPs, including reductions in medical recordkeeping costs, reductions in repeat tests, decreases in length of stay, increased patient safety, and reduced medical errors. There is evidence to support the cost-saving benefits anticipated from wider adoption of EHRs.

There's no truly robust evidence of generalizable benefit, no randomized trials, there's significant evidence to the contrary (that, incidentally, is deliberately being ignored), there's risk to safety that this disruptive technology causes in its present state (but the magnitude is unknown, see quotes from 2012 IOM study here) that MU and "certification" do not address, there's a plethora of hair-raising defect reports from the only seller that reports such things, but CMS justifies the program with the line:

"Evidence [on benefits] is limited ... Nonetheless, we believe there are substantial benefits that can be obtained by eligible hospitals and EPs ... There is evidence to support the cost-saving benefits anticipated from wider adoption of EHRs."

I am deeply impressed by the level of rigorous science here.  We are truly in a golden age of science.

I recommend NIH, NSF, FDA and all other research and regulatory agencies immediately adopt this rigorous HHS methodology (called the "NWB" methodology for "nonetheless we believe") in their professional pursuits and research grant approval processes.

-- SS

Parallels Between the Anechoic Effect in Finance and in Health Care: Predator Nation by Charles Ferguson

What has gone wrong with health care now seems to be the same as what has gone wrong with finance, and society at large.  This was not always obvious to those of us toiling in medicine, probably because we were so focused on medicine that we paid too little attention to the larger world around us.  The people I interviewed in preparation for writing A Cautionary Tale, [Poses MD. A cautionary tale: the dysfunction of American health care.  Eur J Int Med 2003; 14: 123-130.  Link here.] identified broad issues that helped characterize American health care dysfunction.  Neither they nor I, however, initially thought that these problems were tied to the broader society.  In fact, I often wondered back then why health care, and it seemed particularly academic medicine, was so uniquely cursed.

Now it seems obvious in retrospect that health care, finance, politics, and society are circling the same drain.  Now there has been enough time since the beginning of the great recession/ global financial collapse for some people to describe the larger problems.

The Anechoic Effect

We have frequently discussed what we called the "anechoic effect" in health care.  In short, this meant that discussing the big problems in health care, particularly those involving leadership and governance, was simply not done, particularly by the academics who could have addressed the problem.  Lots of examples of the anechoic effect are here.  We have postulated that this has to do with fear of offending the rich and powerful who now lead and govern health care organizations, and the benefits, which may be produced by conflicts of interest, of maintaining good relationships with these rich and powerful.

Charles Ferguson in Predator Nation on the Anechoic Effect

Meanwhile, the anechoic effect was a big reason that finance became such a big mess.  Charles Ferguson, as we have previously discussed, has been one of the most insightful commentators on the great recession/ global financial collapse, starting with his Academy Award winning documentary Inside Job.



This year he published Predator Nation (Ferguson C. Predator Nation: Corporate Criminals, Political Corruption, and the Hijacking of America. New York: Crown Business, 2012.) a more complete account of our financial disaster.  It has a section on what we on Health Care Renewal would call the anechoic effect, and how it is driven by perverse incentives (pp 81-82) :
You see a horrific train wreck in the making, with all your coworkers contributing to it. But they are all making a fortune, and their manager - who is your boss too - is making even more money by keeping it going. Quite obviously, they're going to keep doing it whether you participate or not; so even if you refuse to participate, the firm will be dead anyway. You can try to stop it by going over your boss's head to the CEO; but your boss won't like that at all, and he and the entire department will tell the CEO whatever they need to tell him in order to keep it going. And if - speaking purely hypothetically - your CEO is an oblivious, selfish, obnoxious egomaniac nearing retirement age, heavily focused on his golf game and art collection, with a few hundred million in cash already stashed away, scheduled to rake in another $50 million this year, whose contract guarantees him another $100 million if he loses his job - well, then he probably won't be very sympathetic to you either. You could try going to the board of directors, but even if you could reach them, it will turn out that they are old pals of the CEO, often stunningly clueless, picked largely so that they won't rock the boat.

So if you try to stop the party, you'll probably get marginalized or fired, as happened to a number of serious, ethical people who tried to warn their management and curtail unethical and illegal conduct in Merrill Lynch, Lehman, Citigroup, AIG and elsewhere. So you'd gain nothing by acting ethically - quite the contrary, you'd ostracize yourself and lose your chance to build (or rather, transfer to yourself) some real personal wealth - possibly once-in-a-lifetime opportunity.

Summary: the Application to Health Care, and What Must be Done to Change Things

So consider how much of this might apply to a) serious, ethical employees of large health care corporations, and b) health care professionals who are employees of large health care non-profits, and/or have major financial relationships (conflicts of interest) with large health care corporations. 

Regarding the latter, think of the health care professionals who worked at the Allegheny Health Education and Research Foundation (AHEF) back in the 1990s, and who were told by their multi-millionaire CEO,  "Don’t cross me or you will live to regret it."  How inclined would they have been to blow the whistle on his supposedly "visionary" leadership?  On Health Care Renewal, we have posted lots of relevant newer examples of bad behavior by wealthy leaders of drug, device, biotechnology, health care information technology, and health insurance companies.  We have also posted lots of relevant newer examples of bad behavior within hospital systems and academic medical centers.  Yet most of these generated little resistance from within the organizations at the time they were occurring, and those who did try to blow the whistle often did not fare very well. 

The biggest issue is clearly that if you are in a system which may hugely award clueless, or bad behavior (i.e., that has perverse incentives), then those who might protest will be effectively silenced by those who are profiting from the status quo.

Combating this would require serious outside regulation to discourage perverse incentives and conflicts of interest, serious law enforcement to prosecute any resulting fraud, bribery, etc, and serious protection of whistleblowers, just for a start. All are currently lacking in finance, and in health care. But if we do not put such measures in place, the downward spirals in health care and finance will just continue.

Do not expect to see much discussion of these issues in health care or finance in the current political debate, unless those currently outside of the debate break the anechoic effect and inject them into the debate.

Health IT Amateurs, Logical Fallacy and Hospital Leadership: An Inhibitor to Good Health IT

An excellent three-part article on local providers' efforts to "join the electronic medical record/clinical IT movement", including a middle section "One doctor has reservations about EMR's design, usability", was published yesterday in the Dubuque (IA) Telegraph Herald.

I was cited as that doctor (subscription required).

The article began:

Dr. Scot Silverstein travels the country attending conferences [and other countries as well - ed.], speaking on panels and voicing concerns about health care's headlong rush into a reliance on electronic medical record systems.

"Headlong rush" is an accurate description of my beliefs, as in my "cart before the horse" posts here.

The newspaper reporter continues:

"Older and younger physicians alike are increasingly concerned about the poor design and poor usability of clinical IT," Silverstein said.  

Not only that, but so is ONC, the Institute of Medicine and the National Institute for Standards and Technology, among others, who I indicated were the source of my quotes.

The Drexel University College of Information Science and Technology faculty member calls "EMR" an anachronistic term from a time when the systems were merely storage tools for records.  "What is meant in 2012 is not just an innocuous 'filing cabinet,' but an enterprise clinical resource management and workflow control system - not just storing records, but regulating and governing all clinical behavior and action," Silverstein said.

That is, indeed, my own observation.

Silverstein contends such systems are inappropriate for some health-care environments, such as emergency rooms and intensive-care units.  "They slow down and distract clinicians due to their generally poor user interfaces, in the worst possible setting, and disrupt clinician cognition," he said.

Again, not only me.  As I had written to the reporter:

... These devices are not appropriate for high-risk, high-intensity environments such as ED's, ICU's etc.  They slow down and distract clinicians due to their generally poor user interfaces, in the worst possible setting, and disrupt clinician cognition.  But don't take my word for it.  See the 2012 report from the Institute of Medicine on healthcare IT safety (I wrote about it at http://hcrenewal.blogspot.com/2011/11/iom-report-on-health-it-safety-nix-fda.html), the National Institute of Standards and Technology report on clinical IT usability (http://hcrenewal.blogspot.com/2011/10/nist-on-ehr-mission-hostile-user.html) and the literature I collated at http://www.ischool.drexel.edu/faculty/ssilverstein/cases/?loc=cases&sloc=readinglist.

In fact, document image management systems and human data abstractors are a good tradeoff to meet the needs of the most time-pressed clinicians whose time is a hospital's most valuable asset, and to make patient charts available when and where needed.  This is as opposed to "digital data field and form-based" (i.e., conventional) EMR's that force the clinicians to waste their time in clerical functions and distract them from pressing clinical matters and informational accuracy. 

He then reports:

Silverstein defines such cognition as the decision making and problem solving necessary to provide quality health care.

Precisely.

... Silverstein thinks current clinical IT programs focus too much on raw data and not enough on supporting a physician's decision-making abilities. "As a result, valuable time and energy is spent managing data as opposed to understanding the patient," he said. "Ideally, IT systems would place raw data into context with current medical knowledge to provide clinicians with computer models that depict the health status of the patient, including information on how different organ systems are interacting, epidemiological insight into the local prevalence of disease and potential patient-specific treatment regimens."
 
Actually, it's not just that I think and said these things.  The quote came verbatim, as I had indicated, from the prestigious National Research Council of the United States and their 2009 study on health IT, led by healthcare IT pioneers Drs. Octo Barnett and William Stead.

Any time logically consistent, ethics-based, common sense observations and opinions are expressed about health IT, however, one can always rely on a pundit or hospital executive for a misdirecting, illogical, and/or impertinent comment.

The expected came from Kay Takes, vice president of patient care services at Mercy Medical Center-Dubuque:

 ... Kay Takes, vice president of patient care services at Mercy Medical Center-Dubuque, said the hospital finds electronic medical records a help in the critical environment of the ICU.

"Specifically in the ICU, in the last 13 months we've gotten enhancements that allow us to download values from the medical equipment - it's automatically pulled into the medical record," she said "It's been fantastic. The availability of the information is enormously valuable. It's been a lot more of a benefit than a hindrance."

I speak from experience, in having been involved in developing those exact same capabilities in the mid 1990's (or, most accurately, protecting patients from the dangers created by the IT department in the project), that they are a convenience to those who formerly had to collect the data manually and write it on the ICU flowsheet.

The capabilities are also a mild convenience to clinicians who view the data, although the surface area of a paper flowsheet is a great advantage in seeing more data in one's field of view at one time than the usual small computer screen (to illustrate see my Feb. 2012 post EHR Workstation Designed by Amateurs at this link and my Jan. 2012 post An 'Anecdotal Complaint' About An ICU EHR at this link).

From the latter post:

... And we do still talk to each other – but even that doesn’t always “work out”, because we’ve lost our operational minds (collectively) – the shared-by-all compact, visually all data in one place, and temporally arranged – i.e., the shared nurse/doc/resp flowsheet [traditionally in an ICU, a long tabular scroll of paper for "at a glance" patient status overview - ed.] – where everybody was looking at the same page, which we no longer are – as the team is slowly discovering.

And which required no logon for sign-over bedside rounding (~40 minutes for 20-30 babies was the allotted time). The flowsheet needed only a 10-15 second glance to spot developing problems; “the computer” is effectively inaccessible in the time allotted for the twice daily sign-n-out “rounds”.

Ultimately, though, Ms. Takes, if quoted accurately, commits the logical fallacy of ignoratio elenchi ("ignorance of refutation", missing the point) – an argument that may in itself be valid, but does not address the issue in question.

For this convenience does not at all justify the downsides of EHRs, especially in an ICU:  increased time for task completion, increased risk of errors of commission or omission, and the other risks as outlined in sources such as FDA's 2010 Internal Memo on H-IT Risks, and recently by AHRQ in their IT Hazards Manager project (Appendix B).

Let's review those risks and failure modes from the AHRQ report, all observed empirically in the real world.  From the report:

A health IT hazard is a characteristic of any health IT application or its interactions with any other health care system (e.g., the people, equipment and work spaces of an ICU) that increases the risk that care processes will be compromised and patients harmed.

The potential outcomes of these hazards include medical privacy breach/identity theft, medical misadventures such as errors of commission or omission resulting in "close calls" (errors barely averted), or patient injury, or death, stress on clinicians reducing their performance, and documentation errors or data corruption increasing the risk of errors in the short, medium or long term.  In short, nothing you'd likely desire to occur while you or a family member was a patient:

Usability
• Information hard to find
• Difficult data entry
• Excessive demands on human memory
• Sub-optimal support of teamwork (situation awareness)
• Confusing information display
• Inadequate feedback to the user
• Mismatch between real workflows and HIT
• Mismatch between user mental models/expectations and HIT

Data Quality
• IT contributed to entry of data in the wrong patient’s record
• Organizational policy contributed to entry of data in the wrong patient’s record
• Patient information/results routed to the wrong recipient
• Discrepancy between database and displayed, printed or exported data
• Faulty reference information
• Unpredictable elements of the patient’s record available only on paper/scanned documents
• Lost data
• Inaccurate natural language processing
• Virus or other malware

Decision Support
• Excessive non-specific recommendations/alerts
• Faulty recommendation
• Missing recommendation or safeguard
• Inadequate clinical content
• Inappropriate level of automation

Vendor Factors

• Sub-optimal interfaces between applications and devices
• Faulty vendor configuration recommendation
• Unusable software implementation tools
• Non-configurable software
• Inadequate vendor Testing
• Inadequate vendor software change control
• Inadequate control of user access
• Faulty software design (specification)

Local Implementation

• Faulty local configuration or programming
• Inadequate local testing
• Inadequate project management
• Inadequate software change control
• Inadequate control of user access
• Suboptimal interface management

Other factors
• Inadequate training
• Excessive workload (including cognitive)
• Inadequate organizational change management
• Inadequate management of system downtime or slowdown
• Unclear policies
• Compromised communication among clinicians (i.e., during handoffs)
• Interactions with other (non-HIT) care systems
• Physical environment (e.g., hardware location, lighting, engineering)
• Inadequately secured data
• Hardware Failure
• Use error in the absence of other factors

The convenience of automated data collection through an EMR system comes at, one might say, a slight cost that may not be realized by health IT amateurs.** 

Unfortunately, their lack of knowledge of these issues reduces the caution and "pushback" required for good health IT to become the norm, and permits bad HIT to be sold.


-- SS

** Amateurs in the sense that I am a radio amateur, not a professional, formally trained telecommunications engineer, and would never take a major role in an enterprise telecommunications project, especially a mission-critical one.

8/27/12  Addendum:

A typical, anonymous, irrational response of the type we've seen on this blog before (as for example here and here) has been posted as a comment to the newspaper story:

"nemesis" posted at 1:19 pm on Mon, Aug 27, 2012. 

He travels the country complaining about existing systems? Perhaps the good prof could spend a little time designing the ideal interface/system and see if he can get anyone interested. Surely his design would win them all over.

The problem with this type of comment, of course, is that it's logically fallacious (a form of ad hominem and an odd "appeal to perfection") and irrelevant.  It is no way responds to or refutes the issues I raise in the article.   

It likely comes from a health IT pundit of some sort, but hopefully not someone in a position of authority.  In medicine, the rule of thumb is simple:  "Critical thinking always, or your patient's dead."

-- SS

Will Another Study on Physician Burnout Finally Lead to Addressing its Causes?

The latest article on physician burnout has actually attracted some media attention.  e.g., here and here.

The Latest Article

The article was a survey of physicians in all specialties with over 7000 respondents (unfortunately a less than 27% response rate.)(1)  Its most notable findings were:
- The rate of burnout among physicians was 45.4%
-  Physician specialties with higher than average rates were emergency medicine, general internal medicine, neurology, and family medicine.
- The proportion of physicians who may have been depressed, (using the Primary Care Evaluation of Mental Disorders screening instrument,) was 37.8%

So almost half of all physicians, and more than half of the front-line physicians who treat adults appear to be burned out, while more than one-third of physicians may be clinically depressed.  So it is not surprising that the authors called the rate of burnout "alarming." 

They also commented on the implications of their data,
Unfortunately, little evidence exists about how to address this problem. Although extensive literature suggests that contributors include excessive workload, loss of autonomy, inefficiency due to excessive administrative burdens, a decline in the sense of meaning that physicians derive from work, and difficulty integrating personal and professional life, few interventions have been tested. Most of the available literature focuses on individual interventions centered on stress reduction training rather than organizational interventions designed to address the system factors that result in high burnout rates.
Previous Studies of Burnout and Dissatisfaction

This study, in fact, is just the latest in a long series of studies showing physicians' growing angst, dissatisfaction, burnout, or whatever one calls it. In 1987, in an AMA survey of physicians over 40, 44% replied that were they given chances to do it all over again, they would not go into medicine.(2)  In a 2001 survey of Massachusetts physicians, 62.3% were dissatisfied with the practice environment.(3)  In 2002, a national survey by the Kaiser Family Foundation showed that 45% of physicians would not recommend that a young person should go into medicine.(4)   In a survey of primary care physicians in 2007, 38.7% were somewhat or very dissatisfied.(5)  I have a 6 inch thick set of paper files containing articles on the subject, although it is remarkable how many research studies reported only average scores on instruments, and hence did not report proportions of physicians who were burned out or dissatisfied.

The Causes of Dissatisfaction and Burnout

What is most remarkable about this voluminous literature is its relative lack of attention to the external forces and influences on physicians that are likely to be producing burnout, and the general aversion to promoting any interventions that could conceivably affect these external threats. Instead, burnout etc has been addressed as if it were some sort of psychiatric disease of physicians. This was noted above by Shanafelt et al.

In fact, the reason that we did the crude qualitative literature that lead to my articles on health care dysfunction (6), and to the establishment of Health Care Renewal was a general perception that physician angst was worsening (in the first few years of the 21st century), and that no one was seriously addressing its causes.

Our first crude research suggested that physicians' angst was due to perceived threats to their core values, and that these threats arose from the issues this blog discusses: concentration and abuse of power, bad governance and leadership of health care organizations, and the rise of various dishonest and unethical practices that affect physicians. We have found hundreds of cases and anecdotes supporting this viewpoint.

There is some corroboration of these assertions.  Some written comments from the 2001 Massachusetts survey made similar points about the causes of dissatisfaction, for example: "too much emphasis on the bottom line.  Taken over by large corporations.  Quality of care and interaction now subsumed by productivity and profit," and "the once most noble profession has become a factory job with a facade of ethics"(3)  Pololi and colleagues' qualitative interviews of young medical faculty included anecdotes of angst due to academic leaders who put revenues ahead of patient care, teaching, and research; and who allegedly used deception for personal gain.(7)  (Also, see our comments on this paper)(8)  Pololi and colleagues' large survey of US medical faculty showed that over half thought that managers were only interested in them because of the money they brought in.(9)   We were able to show in a preliminary analysis of data from a physician survey that an instrument meant to measure physicians' perception of the integrity of the leadership of their organizations, which incorporated questions about whether leaders supported core values, put patient care ahead of revenue, supported transparency about quality issues, put patient care ahead of self-interest, and displayed honesty strongly correlated (negatively) with stress, intention to leave the practice, and burnout.(10)

Yet at best studies of physicians' burnout, angst, or dissatisfaction only vaguely allude to "system factors" and not greedy, money-focused, self-interested, or corrupt leadership, etc at its causes.  And again as noted above, most interventions meant to improve burnout have treated it like a psychiatric illness, not a rational response to a badly lead, dysfunctional health care system.

Why Has Nothing Changed?

The real question is why so little has changed given this now 20 plus year history of the documentation of burnout, and why there has been such avoidance of what appears to be the real causes of the problem. One question worth raising again at this time is why the organizations one might think would be interested in helping physicians address causes of burnout have not done so.

One might think that medical societies, foundations interested in improving health and health care, bodies that accredit physicians, and academic medicine in general would all be interested in addressing the causes of physician burnout, dissatisfaction, and angst.  However, I am aware of no significant action on their part.  (There have bee some some marginal actions by the smallest of these organizations, e.g., the Society of General Internal Medicine's call to "chuck the RUC," see this post)

We should not be surprised, since most of these organizations have become more creatures of health care corporations than noble proponents of physicians' core values.  Most of these organizations have substantial institutional conflicts of interest, and are often lead by individuals with their own individual conflicts of interest.   

Medical societies, in particular, now often get significant financial support from industry (pharmaceutical, biotechnology, medical device and even health insurance companies).  The societies' leaders are often full-time executives, not necessarily physicians, who may look to their industry sponsors to continue to provide the funds that support nice salaries and luxurious offices.  The society's officers and boards are often dominated by physicians with their own conflicts of interest.  (Look here for more examples, and see, in particular, the case of the AAOS).

Similar conflicts may affect accrediting organizations, health care foundations, and especially academic medical institutions, as we have profusely discussed.  (Look at our posts on conflicts of interest, and institutional conflicts of interest.)

So if physicians really want to address what is making them burned out and dissatisfied, they will have to regain control of their own societies, organizations, and academic institutions, and ensure that these organizations put core values, not revenue generation and providing cushy compensation to their executives, first.  

References

1.  Shanafelt TD, Boone S, Tan et al. Burnout and satisfaction with work-life balance among US physicians relative to the general US population.  Arch Intern Med 2012; available online here.
2.    cited in Schroeder SA. The troubled profession: is medicine's glass half full or half empty? Ann Intern Med 1992; 116:583-592.
3. Massachusetts Medical Society. Physician satisfaction survey (2001). Link here.
4.  Kaiser Family Foundation. National survey of physicians - part III: doctors' opinions about their profession.  Link here.
5.  Merritt Hawkins & Associates. 2007 survey of primary care physicians.  Link here.
6. Poses MD. A cautionary tale: the dysfunction of American health care.  Eur J Int Med 2003; 14: 123-130.  Link here.
7.Pololi L, Kern DE, Carr P, et al. The culture of academic medicine: faculty perceptions of the lack of alignment between individual and institutional values. J Gen Intern Med 2009; 24: 1289-95. Link here.
8.  Poses RM, Smith WR. Faculty values. J Gen Intern Med 2010; 25: 646. Link here.
9. Pololi L, Ash A, Krupat E. Faculty values in the culture of academic medicine: findings of a national faculty survey. Link here.
10.  Poses RM, Baier-Manwell L, Mundt M, Linzer M. Perceived leadership integrity and physicians’ stress, burnout, and intention to leave practice. J Gen Intern Med 2005; 20: S182.  Link here.

From the University of Chicago EHR Helpdesk Call Line

I was alerted this morning (Aug. 23rd) to this message currently in the telephone message of the CBIS [Chicago Biomedicine Information Services] Service Desk at University of Chicago Medical Center:

"Thanks for calling the CBIS Service Desk.  Your call is very important to us. We are currently experiencing troubles with our Citrix logon.  It may log you on under a different profile.  Please check before you go any further when you're logging in to Citrix."

Citrix is a computer program that allows remote access to information systems.

I imagine the meaning of "log you on under a different profile" means "logging you on as a different user."

The chances of a security breach (ability of unauthorized user to peer into patient's charts they have no business seeing), unauthorized history/order manipulation, or even misidentification error (e.g., a clinician inadvertently acting upon a patient of some other clinician who has a similar name to their own patient) and other distracting work disruptions due to the inconveniences this "trouble" creates are worrisome.

One wonders how every user is being informed of this problem, as not everyone makes it a habit to call the service desk before logging in to clinical systems...

But, alas, this is just a "glitch" (the euphemism used by technophiles for malignant software defects), and, of course, patient safety is never compromised by "glitches."


Patient Safety Will Not Be Compromised, We Predict ... So Say Us All.


-- SS

8/29/12 Addendum:

Apparently the problem was finally solved between 5:30 PM and 9 PM CST on August 27.   I first became aware of it at around 8 AM EST August 23.  Brings to life the line "either you are in control of your information systems, or they are in control of you."

Also, see the comment thread to this post here, specifically the comments starting at August 28, 2012 12:16:00 PM EDT, to see yet another demonstration of the illogic, unserious attitudes and feelings of entitlement towards patient risk and transparency characteristic of the health IT industry.  The anonymous commenter also alleges to have firsthand knowledge of the problem, suggesting they are from U. Chicago, but this cannot be confirmed.

-- SS

BLOGSCAN: Key Opinion Leader Admits to being a Marketer

Without any notable shame, and as a guest blogger on KevinMd.  The post was about other physicians can become big-time KOLs by using social media, and refers to another post which indicates that pharmaceutical companies look for physicians who are big prescribers of their products and have a lot of influence to, guess what, help market their products.  Although the blogger refers to ethics more than once, how it is ethical to trade on the trust physicians get for their professional vows to put patients first to market products (that may not always be good for patients) remains beyond me.

ADDENDUM (27 August, 2012) - See also comments by Dr Howard Brody on the Hooked: Ethics, Medicine and Pharma blog.  

An Even Bigger Golden Parachute for Captain Outrageous

In 2009, I first posted about the amazingly colorful leadership and governance problems at a small hospital system in Massachusetts. 

Background: Northeast Health System

The story of Northeast Health System then included  leaders who solicited money from the community but concealed what they were doing from the same community, an adolescent pregnancy pact after the hospital system refused to provide confidential birth control information at the high school clinic it ran, a hospital vice-president accused of art theft, various cuts, some concealed, of medical services, accusations of conflicts of interest affecting the board of trustees, and no-confidence votes by nurses and physicians. Finally, Stephen Laverty, the CEO held responsible for much of the mess, resigned and things quieted down a bit.  However, he left a system in deficit, leading to further lay-offs, (e.g., see this story in the Boston Globe).  And the vice-president accused of art theft was also "arraigned on bribery and larceny charges" (also per the Boston Globe.)

Nonetheless, in 2010, it was revealed that Mr Laverty left with a golden parachute worth more than $1 million.  But wait, now there is more.

A Guilty Plea
In May, 2012, per the Salem News,
A former associate vice president at Beverly Hospital pleaded guilty yesterday to soliciting bribes and kickbacks from hospital contractors and stealing valuable paintings and other antiques while overseeing a $50 million renovation of the facility.

Paul Galzerano, 60, was sentenced to serve 18 months of a two-year jail term on four larceny counts and two years of probation on two counts of commercial bribery during a hearing yesterday at Salem Superior Court.

Yet More Severance Payments


But wait, there is even more. Yesterday, the Gloucester Times reported about Mr Galzerano's former boss,
Nearly four years after he resigned under fire, former Northeast Health System CEO Stephen Laverty is still collecting big paychecks from his former employer.

Laverty was paid $573,348 in severance in 2011, the second year in a row he has received buyout money from Northeast, the parent nonprofit corporation to Beverly Hospital and Gloucester’s Addison Gilbert Hospital, and a corporation that was essentially merged with Lahey Clinic to become the new Lahey Health System under an agreement that gained the necessary state approvals earlier this year.

Laverty's total severance payments have reached "more than $1.56 million over those two years." Whether the payments have ended is not clear. Attempts to discover why payments continued and became so large revealed only,
Beverly Hospital released a statement Monday saying, 'We cannot comment on Mr. Laverty or the terms of any agreements between the company and past employees.'
Summary

For a relatively small hospital system, Northeast Health System has produced an enormous example of the perverse incentives given to top executives of health care organizations. Mr Laverty has been made a millionaire despite what the Gloucester Times called in its news article a "tenure plagued by acrimony and controversy," and leadership previously described in a Gloucester Times editorial as "arrogant, dictatorial," and a history of what only can be described as outrageous management failures. Furthermore, the money he received came not from rich stockholders, but from a struggling community hospital system.

The ability of top executives of many, probably most health care organizations to collect bloated paychecks out of proportion to, if not despite their performance attracts the wrong people to lead these organizations, and provides incentives for even the right people to lead badly. 

Until we make health care leaders accountable, and until their incentives reflect their ability to uphold the health care mission, expect more unaccountable leadership that subverts the health care mission, and hence continually rising costs, declining access, and deteriorating quality.